By: Mitja Iršič
For decades, the strongest car manufacturers in China were the so‑called “Big Four”: FAW, Changan, Dongfeng, and SAIC, all state‑owned and embedded in a centrally planned economy. Then came a turning point from which Slovenia, too, could learn something.
In 2010, the “Big Four” still controlled around 93 percent of the market. These state‑owned conglomerates faced almost no domestic competition and gradually began exporting abroad – mainly to Oceania.
Sixteen years ago, SAIC held a 31.3% share of all vehicles sold (domestically and abroad), FAW 22.6%, Dongfeng 20.9%, and Changan 17.4%. By 2026, a tectonic shift had occurred: SAIC’s share halved to 15.3%, Dongfeng’s fell to 9.2%, and FAW’s to 8%. Changan has fared best, maintaining roughly the same share, partly because it produces many low‑cost vehicles.
Who replaced them? Two “tigers” from the private sector: BYD and Geely. BYD already holds a 28.2% share of vehicles sold, and Geely 18.4%. Xiaomi, practically from zero, has climbed above 2%, which is especially impressive given that it produces only high‑end sports sedans. The “Big Four” have not only lost market share; today they are also entirely dependent on two battery manufacturers, CATL and BYD, and on the private company Huawei for both hardware and software used in their vehicles.
Private Chinese carmakers have outperformed many state‑owned competitors because they were faster, more innovative, more cost‑efficient, and more willing to take risks. State‑owned companies were far more cumbersome in decision‑making, risk‑taking, and ensuring meritocracy. Some were forced to prioritise production volume and market share over profitability and innovation. Analysts note that bureaucratic structures, political mandates, and slower decision‑making reduced their ability to compete with rapidly developing private rivals.
Interestingly, the government did not offer the “state” manufacturers any protection from private‑sector competition. It left them to the market. Beijing prioritised national technological leadership and global competitiveness over preserving the market share of state‑owned enterprises. The final arbiter was the market, and the market spoke: privately owned companies are more innovative, efficient, profitable, and dynamic than publicly owned ones.
Slovenia can learn from this. Slovenian state‑owned companies are run by political appointees according to Tajnikar’s principle: “We have Adria so we can fly, not so it makes a profit.” They generally have lower returns on capital and assets than comparable private companies, even though they operate in similar sectors and often enjoy privileged access to financing or monopolistic positions. According to European Commission analyses, Slovenian state‑owned enterprises lagged behind both domestic private companies and state‑owned companies in most other Central and Eastern European countries. The Chinese example shows that this is a systemic problem of state‑owned economies, and that the only real remedy is the privatisation of state‑owned giants and the restructuring of stagnant offices where nothing ever happens except crony capitalism and political games.
We now have a historic opportunity to change this and revive the privatisation agenda last seriously discussed in Slovenia back in 2015. There are no more excuses. No more socialist pensioner parties with speech impediments. No more SMC with its red rebellious trio in the background. But there are 48 votes backed by voters who long for economic freedom and for the state to withdraw from the economy.
One day, the children of the revolution will return. What matters is that they never again get the chance to let their apparatchiks run billion‑euro economic systems.