By: Nova24tv.si
“The potential security risks are extremely high, because intelligence services of major countries pursuing their interests use so‑called soft approaches, through which they try to reach precisely those individuals who are in direct contact with the protected person, that is, the person from whom they want to obtain information,” former SOVA director Rajko Kozmelj said in an interview for 24ur Zvečer regarding the revealed connections of the president’s friend. MP Žan Mahnič has therefore submitted a parliamentary initiative requesting that Slovenian intelligence services “immediately cease providing intelligence and security reports” to the Office of the President.
Viktorija Krivolucka, the president’s friend, has been at the centre of attention since it became known that she accompanied the president in an official vehicle involved in the traffic accident. An investigation into the past of the Russian woman with dual citizenship, conducted by the Austrian Press Agency APA and the Slovenian outlet Dnevnik, revealed notable connections, including her link to Roman Jeglič, former deputy head of Slovenia’s first intelligence service, known for signing the report that led to the arrest of Janez Janša in the JBTZ affair. After it emerged that Jeglič had at one point been registered at the same address as Krivolucka, she admitted to 24ur that they had been a couple for several years. She insists she did not know about his past at the time and that she has had no contact with him for at least 15 years. She also stated: “Because of false insinuations in some media, I clearly say that I have never cooperated with foreign intelligence organisations. Such reporting has deeply hurt me.”
Former SOVA director Rajko Kozmelj was asked about the security risks of the friendship between Krivolucka and the Slovenian president. He emphasised that these are potential risks. After clarifying that he has no direct information about the case and knows only what has been reported in the media, he stressed that the risks are not merely high but “extremely high,” “because intelligence services of major countries that pursue their interests use so‑called soft approaches, through which they try to reach precisely those individuals who are in direct contact with the protected person, that is, the person from whom they want to obtain information. Naturally, this includes access to spaces, to the official vehicle, etc.”
Krivolucka could access the president’s most sensitive information
In such a case, he said, the person is an excellent target with a high likelihood of yielding information. “When I speak of information, I mean everything, her positions on specific individual matters, possibly installing a person who is close to her, meaning someone who would advise her or at least share opinions in order to influence her views; obtaining the schedules of her travels, her contacts, and information about the advisers around her whom she trusts the most,” he explained, adding that these are very important intelligence data. According to him, intelligence services of major countries exploit such opportunities. Interests may be greater in some places and smaller in others, but, he says, there is a significant potential security risk.
The Office of the President has stated that Krivolucka was already vetted when obtaining Slovenian citizenship and that no risks were identified. When asked whether SOVA should react considering these new revelations, Kozmelj first explained that security vetting for citizenship is one procedure, while vetting for access to classified information is another. Regarding the citizenship check, he noted that apparently no security concerns were found, but that was ten years ago. “This was before she became president, so in my personal and professional opinion, another mechanism should be used. First, we must determine whether Krivolucka qualifies as a regular and direct contact with the protected person. If that is the case, then the police, under the Police Tasks and Powers Act (ZNPPol), can initiate a procedure and vet such a person. Nowhere else in law do we have this possibility, unless there are indications. So even SOVA cannot act without indications, meaning without suspicion that the person close to the protected individual has direct ties or contacts with a foreign security or intelligence service. Without that, SOVA cannot operate,” he explained, adding that this foreign‑link element is required by the SOVA Act.
“To return to the point: under ZNPPol, the police and police officers performing tasks under this law have the possibility, under Article 99, to carry out such security vetting even without the consent of the person being checked, in this case, the friend, if the contact is defined as regular and direct contact with the protected person,” he continued. He added that the director‑general of the police could issue an order allowing the vetting to be conducted without the person’s consent. When asked who defines whether the contact is regular or not, he explained that this is determined during the procedure itself, when all activities are carried out. “When a security assessment is made, it is known who has regular and direct access to her, who will have access to the vehicle,” he added.
We sent journalistic questions to the Police and SOVA. Among other things, we asked the Police whether, considering the new revelations, the president’s friend will undergo a security vetting. We wanted to know whether she is defined as a person in regular and direct contact with the protected individual, and whether the director‑general of the police has already issued or will issue an order for such vetting. We also asked SOVA whether it possesses any indications or information suggesting links between Krivolucka and foreign security or intelligence services, and whether, considering the new revelations, it will re‑evaluate potential security risks connected to her contacts with the president. We will publish the answers once we receive them.
Proposal to stop providing intelligence and security reports to the president
SDS MP Žan Mahnič has submitted a parliamentary initiative to the government, requesting that, due to suspicions that the president of the republic is cooperating with a Russian spy network, SOVA, the Intelligence‑Security Service of the Ministry of Defence (OVS), and other agencies immediately stop providing intelligence and security reports to the president and her office. “In the public, information has been published about multiple private trips by the President of the Republic of Slovenia, Dr Nataša Pirc Musar, to the Russian Federation, and about connections between individuals in her immediate private circle and Russia, individuals whose biographies reasonably suggest they may be part of a Russian spy network operating on European soil,” the MP states in the introduction.
He highlights the trip at the end of December 2021 and early January 2022, just weeks before the start of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. Additional questions are raised by “the information that Roman Jeglič, former deputy director of the Slovenian intelligence service VIS, who later worked in Russia, was allegedly connected to the former address of Viktorija Krivolucka in Krasnoyarsk.” “The Office of the President of the Republic of Slovenia confirmed that Nataša Pirc Musar had met Roman Jeglič in the past. In my opinion, these circumstances are serious enough to require an appropriate counter‑intelligence and security assessment, as there is reasonable suspicion that the president of the republic is connected to a spy network of the Russian Federation operating on European soil,” Mahnič emphasises. He adds that this is especially important because of the constitutional role of the president, who represents the Republic of Slovenia, is the commander‑in‑chief of the armed forces, and in performing her duties may access the most sensitive classified and intelligence information of Slovenia and its allies.
When protecting classified information of the Republic of Slovenia and our allies, there must be no political exceptions
Mahnič emphasises that Slovenia, as a member of NATO and the European Union, at a time when the Russian Federation represents one of the key counter‑intelligence threats to Europe, must act with the highest degree of caution when safeguarding its own and allied classified information. “The Government of the Republic of Slovenia should propose to the competent intelligence and security agencies that, within their legal powers, they carry out a counter‑intelligence and security assessment of the publicly revealed circumstances related to the president of the republic, her travels to the Russian Federation, and her contacts, as well as the contacts of individuals in her immediate private circle, with persons who could pose a security risk,” the MP suggests. He believes the government, together with the Government Office for the Protection of Classified Information, should examine “whether current legislation provides sufficient security mechanisms even in cases where security concerns arise regarding the highest state officials, who have access to classified information without a security clearance, and, if necessary, prepare amendments to the Classified Information Act.” He is convinced that there must be no political exceptions when protecting classified information of Slovenia and its allies. “Until the circumstances are properly examined, national security must take precedence over the president’s access to the most sensitive information of the state and its allies, information she could potentially share with the Russian Federation,” he adds.
