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Is there a much bigger story hiding behind the traffic accident in Kastelec?

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(Photo: AI)

By: Gašper Blažič

Is the traffic accident affair and the misuse of state protocol for private purposes a hot soup that is finally cooling down? In the week following the publication of our previous article on the matter, a considerable silence followed.

In fact, it seemed as if things were continuing normally. During the holiday weekend, Nataša Pirc Musar appeared on the Slovenian coast and – apparently following the example of Borut Pahor – even made pancakes. Allegedly with a broken collarbone, which is certainly a medical phenomenon. Clearly, this act also falls within the scope of “damage control”, as marketing expert Dr Andrej Drapal suggested in an interview we publish separately.

KPK will not pursue Pirc Musar

However, the latest revelations have shown that the deep state might also be willing to abandon Pirc Musar, who will very likely be seeking her second presidential term next year. Well, at least a month ago it seemed likely, now it is no longer so self‑evident. Much will probably depend on her challengers, as the already mentioned Borut Pahor might return to the race, even though he is currently not in the spotlight. If that truly happens, the deep state will have to pull a new ace from its sleeve. Let us recall: in 2012, Danilo Türk lost his bid for a second term precisely to Pahor; five years later, they sent Marjan Šarec into the game, who did not defeat Pahor (though he came fairly close), but was realistically being prepared for the role of prime minister, which he assumed in 2018, albeit only for two years. Already before the last presidential elections in 2022, we warned about the questionable role of Pirc Musar during her time as Information Commissioner, as it turned out she acted primarily in favour of censorship. She targeted Demokracija several times, with two particularly notable cases in 2006 and 2011. First due to the publication of salaries at the newspaper Delo, which fiercely attacked the first Janša government, and later due to the revelation of email exchanges between Mladina journalists and judicial officials. As a lawyer, Pirc Musar also engaged in lawsuits against the media, and among other clients represented the Legal‑Information Centre for NGOs (PIC) and its former director Katarina Bervar Sternad. In 2023, Pirc Musar awarded her a human‑rights recognition, and three years later appointed her as president of the Commission for the Prevention of Corruption (KPK), where the appointment of vice‑presidents is entirely in the hands of the president of the republic. This raises the question of what happens if the person who appointed the members of the KPK senate becomes entangled in corruption. As the saying goes: a crow does not peck out another crow’s eyes.

Tourism, Russian‑style

The issue of corruption is, as far as the Slovenian public is concerned, quite sensitive. Recently, some media circulated the news that Interior Minister Franci Matoz owns a yacht. The reporting was rather vague, giving the impression that taxpayers had paid for it. But a comparison with former agriculture minister Mateja Čalušić shows that he bought it before becoming minister, with his own income. In this comparison, agriculture minister Janez Cigler Kralj would fare somewhat worse due to the purchase of an official car, although it turned out to be a used vehicle. These were likely stories intended to stir up as much dust as possible after the unfortunate response of the president’s office to media reporting. This was followed by the pancake‑making episode as an example of “crisis PR”. According to Bojan Požar, sources had predicted this event ten days in advance – shortly after the accident in which Pirc Musar allegedly injured herself (broke her collarbone). Because at a time when the transitional left is intensely fussing over the “Black Cube” construct and simultaneously scolding Zoran Stevanovič for his visit to Moscow, it will be difficult to justify the practically unjustifiable association of the president of the republic with Viktorija Krivolucka. She is, incidentally, according to our information, even a dual citizen?! She supposedly obtained Slovenian citizenship on the basis of sporting achievements, but we still have not been able to find out what those achievements were. There are photographs showing Krivolucka in official clothing of the Slovenian Olympic team. But it is not just about photographs, it is also about numerous trips Pirc Musar made to Russia. These reportedly took place before 2022, meaning at a time when she was not yet president and Russia had not yet launched its active aggression against Ukraine.

Jeglič as the connecting link

There is also the question of intelligence activity and state security – partly because of information first published, interestingly, by Dnevnik (which suggests the possibility that Pirc Musar might lose the support of Milan Kučan). It concerns the connection between Krivolucka and former criminal investigator Roman Jeglič, who in 1988 appeared as the official who signed the order for the arrest of Janez Janša in the JBTZ case. Jeglič allegedly lived in her apartment in Krasnoyarsk – the centre of a region where, in the late 1990s, the governor was former Yeltsin associate Aleksander Lebed. Lebed was considered a possible successor to Yeltsin but was later dismissed. He died in a suspicious helicopter crash in 2002, when Vladimir Putin was already in power. Putin then established a special state commission led by the then minister for emergency situations, Sergei Shoigu, to officially investigate the crash. Shoigu is known for having been Russia’s defence minister at the start of the Russian aggression against Ukraine and is still considered a close confidant of Vladimir Putin. Putin allegedly had a strong motive to remove Lebed, as he was too independent from the Kremlin and had also achieved the end of the First Chechen War – while its continuation had elevated Putin to power. Lebed had already posed a threat to Putin when he headed the Russian intelligence network. In 1997, Lebed publicly claimed in interviews for Western media that Russia had lost several dozen portable nuclear suitcase bombs.

How Russian spies were returned

By itself, this does not represent a direct connection to the case of Nataša Pirc Musar’s Russian ties. But considering the arrest and return of the Russian spy couple two years ago, we can conclude that it was a rather unusual operation by Golob’s government. The spies were supposedly returned to Russia after the married couple (Artyom Viktorovich Dulcev and his wife) were convicted of espionage during judicial holidays – through a fast‑track and, of course, secret procedure. This was apparently done so that they would not serve their sentences, since in Russia they are formally innocent. Moreover, Vladimir Putin ceremonially welcomed them at the airport and later even decorated them. This completely confused their underage children, who had been raised in Slovenia as “Argentinians” and did not know they were actually Russians. In return, Slovenia did not receive anything, although then‑U.S. President Joe Biden thanked Prime Minister Robert Golob. But it seems the whole operation was carried out mainly as an attempt by Golob to secure strong support in the international arena. Furthermore, it turned out to be just another performance for the public.

Slovenia was only a small piece of the puzzle, as the key for the U.S. was an agreement with Germany, from which they wanted approval for the release of Vadim Nikolaevich Krasikov. Slovenia joined at the last moment, under pressure from Biden. Krasikov was a Russian contract killer and former colonel in the Russian intelligence agency FSB. In 2019, he was sentenced to life imprisonment in Germany for the murder of Zelimkhan “Tornike” Khangoshvili in Berlin – a Chechen who had fought against the Russians. All of this raises the question of who was involved in these manoeuvres. It also places left‑wing slogans about a “political police” in a completely new context.

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