By: Franci Kindlhofer
After Hitler’s attack on Poland on September 1st, 1939, the French stated that they did not intend to die for Warsaw. A year later, the Germans were in Paris.
When we talk lately about the waning global interest in the liberation war in Ukraine, a dangerous sense arises that Putin is approaching success, thanks to the prolonged duration of the war, more than expected. Is it really so?
In-depth analyses of the war from its beginning on February 24th, 2022, to the present show us a slightly different picture. February 24th, 2022, reminds me quite a bit of the date June 22nd, 1941, when Hitler attacked the Soviet Union. Despite the intense movements of German forces near the Soviet border and even clear warnings from Western diplomatic circles, Stalin at that time had no doubts about the alliance with Hitler and completely ruled out any ill intentions of Nazi Germany. It turned out that all agreements with Hitler, from the non-aggression pact to the border and friendship treaty, were only in favour of Germany, which, from August 22nd, 1939, when the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact was signed, fully exploited them for its purposes. Germany occupied all major European countries or entered into cooperation agreements with some. In addition, the Soviet Union supplied it with the necessary raw materials and food for the army, especially grain.
The cause of the conflict between Russia and Ukraine significantly differs from that between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union. However, if free Europe does not take action, the consequences may be similar to those that occurred after the signing of the pact on August 22nd, 1939. Just as Hitler pretended to support a partnership with Stalin at that time, Putin, until 2022, outwardly presented good relations with the West as a sign of goodwill and partnership. And how did the West respond? All Western leaders assumed, without taking offense at the comparison, the role of Stalin after the pact with Hitler. For the sake of domestic peace, they forgave Putin for Chechnya, the murders of journalists, staged trials against political rivals, stifling democratic development, and, ultimately, the annexation of parts of the sovereign state of Ukraine.
When Putin extended his influence over Ukraine, all alarm bells should have rung in Western Europe and the United States. However, what did Western politicians do? Instead of setting clear demands for Putin to return the annexed territory or calling for a solution at the United Nations while setting short deadlines and simultaneously threatening with severe sanctions, they cautiously probed in Minsk what Putin might be willing to accept. The Minsk I agreements and their amendments in Minsk II were not worth much more than the paper they were written on. There was even an impression that Putin’s value had increased because now many things depended on his goodwill. Putin took plenty of time for reflection over coffee with his friend, the former German Chancellor Schröder. This money-hungry social democrat was already firmly seated in the Gazprom board and contributed his political weight to the construction of the North Sea pipeline, which was harmful to Ukraine. Although the Minsk I + II agreements were a better solution for Russia than for Ukraine, Russia did not adhere to them. On the contrary, it sought to create established facts to strengthen Russian presence in the region. This effort included the construction of the Kerch Strait Bridge, connecting the Crimean Peninsula to the Russian mainland.
Putin rightly got the impression that the West was not very interested in Ukraine. This perception solidified with the failed attempt, thanks to Merkel and Macron, to make Ukraine a NATO member. Thus, Putin saw no serious obstacles to embarking on a complete resolution of the Ukrainian issue. Following the familiar Soviet-Russian pattern, he devised a plan to bring Ukraine back under the former Soviet influence. In the occupied territories, he organised unrecognised referendums for joining Russia. These were confirmed by the Russian Duma, and on February 21st, 2022, Putin officially revoked the Minsk agreements. One does not need to be a global politics analyst of any kind. Anyone familiar with this sequence of events must understand that Putin deliberately prepared for the annexation of Ukraine, counting on further Western and NATO passivity.
When Russia attacked a completely unprepared Ukraine on February 24th, 2022, there was indeed an outcry in the West, but it was not immediately clear whether the West would once again swallow this Putinian pill or not. Only the decisive reaction of Ukraine, declaring that it would defend itself with all available means, prompted the West to realise that its credibility was now at stake concerning freedom and the international rule of law. NATO and the EU responded in favour of Ukraine, but rather hesitantly. This is particularly noticeable when comparing it to the reaction of the United States and Germany to Hamas’ attack on Israel.
Ukraine did not receive the kind of support that Germany extended to Israel, saying, “We will support you with everything you need”. There is an unexplainable reservation towards Ukraine in the European consciousness, as if offering them a finger would mean they would want the whole hand. This is perplexing, especially considering military experts in NATO and the USA who understand what a “joint operation” entails. Ukrainians were not familiar with such luxury. Their early success in the war was largely due to Russia’s poor tactics and the belief that capturing Ukraine would be a leisurely stroll with tanks rather than a serious conquest. At least the Russians were accustomed to such actions until then. It remains an open question whether the Russian intelligence service diligently analysed the actual political situation in Ukraine and the sentiments of the population regarding Russia.
The West, especially the United States, has done a great deal to provide military assistance to Ukraine. Given the amount of billions already spent on the war in Ukraine, an interesting question arises. If someone invests so much money in this war, it is reasonable to expect that the donors will also ensure that this investment is as successful as possible. This means that everyone should be responsible for ensuring that aid is rapid, without hesitation, and comprehensive – in other words, everything needed must be supplied. The opponent should not be allowed longer breaks in battles, as it enables them to reorganise and fortify their positions. Due to delays in the supply chain, Ukraine’s successful streak in liberating territory was interrupted in the autumn, and this hindered the Ukrainian spring offensive. With this unexplainable hesitancy from Western countries, which otherwise contribute the most, Europe is slipping into a very dangerous phase where fatigue may cause a weakening of support for Ukraine, forcing us to let Putin succeed. This would entail facing all unpredictable consequences, including a loss of trust in NATO, or NATO might eventually have to intervene in the war to salvage the honour of the West.
German diplomat Wolfgang Irschinger, the German ambassador to the USA and the United Kingdom, who led the Munich Security Conference from 2008 to 2022, recently called for greater Western engagement in Ukraine and increased pressure on Russia. I fully agree with him here. Many politicians caution against direct involvement in the Ukrainian war to avoid endangering our lives. This is understandable. Therefore, a call for a more decisive approach does not necessarily mean a call to war. Putin successfully exploits these fears in his brinkmanship with the West. What can we do?
– It is irresponsible not to supply Ukraine with highly effective weapons.
– It is incomprehensible to demand from Ukraine, which is exposed to constant aerial attacks, not to use supplied weapons on Russian territory. This ensures a safe rear for the Russian army in the immediate vicinity of the Ukrainian border.
– Ukraine must be able to endure the war into Russia as much as possible, weakening Putin’s reputation because Russians will feel the war on their own skin. It is unbearable that Russia indiscriminately bombs civilian targets in Ukraine, and when Russia has its first civilian casualties, it should be brought before the Security Council.
– NATO should provide technical and strategic assistance to Ukraine on its unoccupied territory. Russia should be warned that NATO soldiers are there, and they should consider this in their attacks.
– Strong NATO units, including aviation, should be deployed to the Ukrainian border. Then, diplomatic channels should be used to engage with the Russians.
The Russian problem is Putin
Russia cannot afford a war with NATO, and NATO member states do not desire it either. However, it is necessary to demonstrate that we are prepared for anything. This would require a great deal of tact and diplomatic skill. Russian diplomacy and politics must realise that their problem is Putin and his clique.
I know that some will accuse me of inciting war. To them, I must respond that I cannot do that because the war is already underway. Now it is about preventing further escalation and achieving a desired halt.
