By: mag. Andrej Vastl
The election year 2022 in Slovenia was marked by a strong political mobilisation against the then government of Janez Janša. The Freedom Movement, the Social Democrats, and the Left entered the race with promises to normalise the political space, depoliticise institutions, promote a culture of dialogue, and introduce a different way of governing the state. A large share of voters did not vote merely for a change of government, but above all for the expectation of a more “calm and unifying” politics.
Anti‑Janšism became the central political framework of the left‑wing and liberal part of the political space during this period. This approach proved successful in the 2022 elections, as it united various political groups around a common goal. However, already in the first years of the term, the limitations of a political model that builds its legitimacy primarily on opposing a political rival began to emerge.
A negative political identity can generate strong political energy in the short term. But it is much more difficult for it to provide a long‑term developmental vision for the state and ensure effective management of public systems. This gradually became evident during the 2022–2026 term.
At the beginning of the mandate, the coalition spoke extensively about dialogue, inclusion, and respect for pluralism. In practice, however, much of political communication often remained trapped in the logic of settling accounts with “Janšism.” Notable were Prime Minister Dr Robert Golob’s statements about “cleansing Janšism” at RTV Slovenia and within the police, which triggered numerous political reactions (Delo, 17 Oct 2024). His remark that the procedure of the Commission for the Prevention of Corruption was a “farce” when the KPK examined allegations by former minister Tatjana Bobnar regarding alleged political pressure on the police (24ur, 4 Dec 2024) also sparked significant debate.
Such statements carry particular weight because they come directly from the top of the executive branch. For part of the public, they created the impression that the Slovenian political space remained strongly marked by ideological conflict and political division even after 2022.
At the same time, political polarisation did not significantly decrease. In some segments of the public sphere, it even deepened. Part of the public began to feel that Slovenian politics was still too focused on the division between “us” and “them,” and not enough on the long‑term developmental issues of the state.
Concrete results of state governance also played an important role in shifting political sentiment. Healthcare remained one of the biggest systemic problems, as waiting times did not significantly decrease. Housing policy did not bring the expected momentum in the construction of public housing, and many digitalisation and modernisation projects progressed more slowly than initially announced. Amid political tensions, the impression often remained that the state was preoccupied mainly with itself.
It was at this point that anti‑Janšism gradually began to lose its political strength. After a certain period, voters evaluate symbolic political conflict less and increasingly assess the concrete results of those in power. Issues of living standards, access to healthcare, housing problems, security, and the overall effectiveness of the state come to the forefront.
The 2022–2026 term also revealed the limitations of political projects that build their identity primarily on opposing the previous government. In part of the political space, the impression gradually formed that much political energy was directed mainly toward distancing from the previous government’s period and toward altering or reshaping existing policies and documents. Far less was perceived in terms of long‑term developmental consolidation of the state and a clear programmatic direction for the future.
This raises a broader question of whether political parties without sufficiently clear programmatic foundations can maintain political stability in the long run. Slovenian political practice often shows that political projects created primarily as a response against the previous government gradually lose their initial political momentum after one term. Such projects find it more difficult to grow into long‑term stable political structures with a clear identity and developmental vision.
The re‑appointment of Janez Janša as prime minister and the formation of a new coalition between SDS, NSi, SLS, and Fokus, with the support of the non‑coalition party Resnica, therefore also represents an important political signal from part of the electorate. A significant portion of citizens increasingly expects politics to provide stability, predictability, and effective governance. This does not mean that political differences in Slovenia do not exist or that political criticism is not legitimate. Criticism of those in power remains a normal part of democratic life. But it does mean that Slovenian society is gradually becoming weary of constant ideological conflict and prolonged political mobilisation against individual political actors.
Slovenia today therefore needs above all a politics capable of reducing social tensions, building institutional trust, and shaping a broader sense of shared future. Citizens increasingly expect effective public systems, a stable economy, security, accessible housing, and a predictable state. For this reason, the coming political period will likely be less marked by mobilisation against individual political personalities and much more by the question of the state’s ability to govern effectively and deliver concrete results for its citizens.