By: Dr Andrej Umek
Of all the referendums announced for this autumn, the most important one, at least for me, is the referendum on the emergency law. The so-called emergency law has a clear purpose: to return Slovenia to the path that Slovenians endorsed in the 1990 plebiscite, which explicitly linked independence to democracy and a free-market economy. The referendum result confirmed that a large, rarely seen majority supported an independent Republic of Slovenia, a democratic state with a free-market economic system. Of course, not everyone considered this their first choice, and their opposition to the plebiscitary decision has ultimately led us to the referendum on the emergency law.
To substantiate this claim, I must go back more than 35 years. At the end of the 1980s, communist regimes found themselves in the midst of a severe economic crisis. Their economies were so inefficient that they could no longer satisfy even the most basic needs of their citizens. Let me give just one example. If you wanted to do your laundry at that time, you had to go to Austria or Italy to buy washing powder, because it was unavailable in Slovenia. Because of widespread shortages, the collapse of the system loomed, and different communist parties responded in different ways. Mikhail Gorbachev, leader of the Soviet communists, announced perestroika, while Milan Kučan, leader of the Slovenian communists, announced a withdrawal from power. Most communist parties did not publicly define their position, among them notably China. Gorbachev’s goal was to restructure the economy, make it more successful, and thereby preserve both the Soviet Union and communist rule. Kučan’s plan, at least as I see it, was different. It envisaged permitting a multiparty system while the Communist Party retained complete control over the economy and, consequently, de facto political power. Gorbachev’s plan failed. Communist regimes in the Soviet Union and its Eastern European satellite states collapsed, and the Soviet Union disintegrated. China did not publicly embrace this model, but, according to the author, successfully implemented it. Its economy became successful while the Communist Party retained complete control of the country. In Slovenia, events did not unfold entirely according to the communists’ plans, yet left-leaning parties continued to pursue the original objective behind the withdrawal from power.
At first, it appeared that Slovenia would successfully transition into a modern European state. In 1990, the country elected its first freely chosen government since the Second World War. That government began implementing reforms that promised a successful transition to democracy and a market economy. In the political sphere, it achieved independence and adopted a democratic constitution. Economically, the laws on privatisation and denationalisation were particularly important. However, following the 1990 elections and the victory of the Liberal Democracy of Slovenia (LDS), the government of Dr Janez Drnovšek immediately introduced measures that radically altered the earlier Demos concept and redirected Slovenia toward the “withdrawal from power” model. In this regard, special mention is made of the law on privileged internal buyouts, which enabled many directors appointed under the communist system to acquire ownership of the companies they managed.
This was followed by alternating periods in which governments led by Janez Janša moved the Slovenian economy toward a freer market model, while left-leaning governments steered it back toward the original concept of the transition. The government of Dr Robert Golob was particularly active in this regard. Through various measures, it sought to establish complete control over the economy, although it did not alter ownership structures directly. One example cited is the creation of the Defence Fund. This reduced companies in the defence sector to the status of socialist subcontractors. Furthermore, left-leaning governments failed or refused to recognise that reducing economic freedom automatically leads to a lower GDP per capita and therefore a lower standard of living than would exist under a freer economy.
The alliance of NSi, SLS, and Fokus was already aware during the 2026 election campaign that achieving a stronger economy and higher living standards would require a decisive break with the economic policies of Golob’s government. As a first step in this direction, it prepared the so-called emergency law. Slovenian citizens, the author argues, should understand that supporting the emergency law in a referendum would mean moving closer to the living standards of Western Europe. Rejecting the law, on the other hand, would mean moving backward and risking general impoverishment.
